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APPE NDIX H

I

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN FAMILY
COURTS
Barbara A. Babb'
Judith B. Moran"

I.

Introduction

Judicial independence has become an increasingly important area of
concern forcourt reformers , academics, the bench, and the bar.'
Professional associations, such as the American Bar Association and
the American Judicature Society, have begun initiatives to focus on
the issue, as have citizens groups. 2 Several law journals have published symposia on the topic, as well.'
Court reform initiatives are an integral part of judicial independence
in the family court context, and, in fact. they have the potential to
facilitate an autonomous family court judiciary. Professor Barbara
Babb has written extensively on family court reform" She posits that
some statewide family court reform projects , notably one that recently was implemented in Maryland . have supported improved judicial
selection processes. This process now includes a focu s on the candi date's background in and temperament for handling family law matte r s. Arguably, judges who are familiar with and interested in family
law will be less subject to the political and social forces that influence
fa mily law decision - making.
Th e independence of th e family court judiciary is influenced by mul tipl e factors, whi ch encompass some of socie ty's most deeply held
b elie fs . 5 These include issues such as th e age at which minors should
b e subj ect to criminal responsibility and punishment, the grounds
for m a rital dissolution , gender- related issu es in child custody
awa rds, and child r earing sta ndards th at d e fin e child abuse and n eglect. In addition to these philosophical and m o ral judgments, famil y
law d eciSio n - m aking also is influenced by th e method of judicial
,
Associlte Profeuor of uw Ind Director, Center for Families. Children and the Courts. Univenlty of
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selection, the scope of a particular family court's subject matter jurisdiction, community norms and concerns, the expectations of society
for judicial decision-making, and the manner in which judges conduct their personal lives.
Most discourses on judicial independence focus on judicial elections and the adverse consequences of selecting judicial officers via
this method. The presumption is that when a judge is appointed, she
will be freer to make decisions notwithstanding political forces. This
assumption, however, may not be particularly relevant in the family
court context. In this context, the decisions made are affected not
only by external forces, such as community norms and political
issues, but by internal factors resulting from a judge's personal experience in her own family. Each judge, after all, is herself the priduct
of a family, and, presumably, she relates to many of the issues that
bring families to court. Personal biases borne out of particular circumstances are bound to impact a judge's thinking.
Even if these internal forces are managed, the appointment process
as opposed to the election process in and of itself does not support
judicial independence. Consider the family court judge appointed by
a state or local government official who has an interest in lowering
the juvenile crime rate. When faced with a delinquency case, that
judge is likely to be influenced by the person to whom she "owes" her
seat on the bench. Overall, the most important factor regarding judicial independence in the family court context, however, may be that
we do not want judges to have so much discretion in family law matters. As a result of our ambivalence, we tether their decisions to
statutes, which circumscribe their roles. 6
This paper will discuss the particular factors that influence judicial
independence in the family court context. First, the paper addresses
procedural mechanisms by which an individual becomes a judge.
Second, family court jurisdiction and its relationship to the issue of
judicial autonomy are addressed. Third, the paper discusses the
impact of social norms and political forces on particular aspects of
family law decision-making. Finally, the effect of the media, the
expectations the public has for judges, and legislative influences on
judicial discretion are noted.

6 SeeJohnJ. Sampson. Bringing the Courts to Heel: Substituting Legislative Poliryfor Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L. Q.
565 (1999) (noting the trend towards legislative control over family law decision-making).
brr
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II. Factors InfluencingJudicial Independence in the FaInily
Court Context

Method of....Tudicial Selection
The way in which an individual becomes a family court judge varies
from state to state. In Maryland, for example, judges are appointed
by the governor for a one-year term and then are subject to a "retention election"7 for the remaining fourteen-year term of office. Judges:
who survive the election process are then selected by the administrative judge in each Circuit Court to sit in that court's Family Division
for an eighteen-month period. In contrast, New York City's Family
Court judges are appointed by the mayor. As John Sampson has
noted, "We now have in this country a patchwork quilt of judicial
selection methods ."8 The most popular selection method appears to
be the electoral process. 9
Although reformers criticize the election of judges in so far as it has
the potential to erode judicial independence, appointing family court
judges does not guarantee an independent judiciary. Family court
judges are not immune to outside influences, as they are susceptible
to political pressures brought to bear by the elected officials who
make decisions about the composition of the family court bench. As
stated above, in New York City the mayor determines the make-up of
the Family Court judiciary. A recent analysis of Family Court judicial
appointments by former Mayor Giuliani has highlighted the extent to
which his Family Court appointments have reflected his crime control agenda. Daniel Wise states in a recent New York Law Journal
article that "[s]omewhat more consistently than his predecessors,
practitioners said, Mr. Giuliani has appointed lawyers who spent a
large part of their careers as prosecutors, either of criminal cases
against adults or juvenile delinquency cases in Family Court."lo

Family Court Turisdiction
The breadth of a family court's jurisdiction varies from state to state.
In some states II family courts have the authority to decide all matters
relating to family law. 12 In others, family court subject matter juris7 See id. at 584.
8 See id.
9 See id. (noting that about forty-two states utilize this process).
IO See Daniel Wise. Lauyers Find Smart. CommiHedJudges in Court Defined ~ Tension. N .Y.L.J.
March 19. 2002 at I.
II See Babb. supra note 4. at 471 [citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-1101 (1995). §§ 16-2301 to 16-2365 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571- 14 (1993)].
12 See id. (Defining family law as cases involving divorce. annulment and property distribution; child
custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity. adoption. and termination of parental
rights; juvenile delinquency. child abuse and child neglect; domestic violence; criminal non-support;
name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; and withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining medical procedures. involuntary admissions and emergency evaluations).

....11
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diction is limited to deciding matters relating to child protection and
dependency, juvenile delinquency, child custody and visitation. 13
Conceivably, the scope of a family court's jurisdiction affects the
degree to which a judge is influenced by the community at large and
by discrete political constituencies, as well as the extent to which the
public has confidence in family court decisions or outcomes.
Family courts whose primary jurisdictional mandates are juvenile
causes attract attention from communities focused on crime control
and prevention. Consequently, judges may be influenced by anticrime initiatives that cause them to detain delinquent youth, rather
than sentence them to probation and community-based rehabilitation programs. Conversely, family courts wiih more expansive jurisdiction may be scrutinized on many levels, including issues of
divorce, child custody, and family violence. One legal scholar opines
that the more comprehensive the jurisdiction of the family court, the
greater the public interest. 14
A family court with comprehensive jurisdiction, however, may support an independent thinking judiciary and promote consumer confidence in the court system. In her discussion of unified family
courts, Professor Babb suggests that one of the values of the unified
family court model is that it supports informed judicial decisions by
making available to judges support staff with backgrounds in mental
health and social work.15 These individuals assist the judge byassessing families, thereby helping to ensure that the court issues decisions
that are appropriate for the family's particular circumstances.
Arguably, the result may be an increased public trust in the judges
who decide family law cases, which, in turn, promotes their independence.
Conununit)' Norms/Political Forces
Community norms and political forces influence nearly every area of
family law. The more notable influences on particular family law case
categories are discussed below.

Ch.ild Protection
Judicial decision-making in child protection matters clearly is influenced by public policy. Laws reflective of how best to safeguard the
welfare of children, while protecting the integrity of the family, guide
family court judges to decide the critical issue of where to place a
13 N.Y. Fam. Court Act §II5 (2001).
14 See Interview with Barbara A. Babb, Associate Professor of Law,

University of Baltimore School of
Law, in Baltimore, MD (June 10, 2002).
15 See Barbara A. Babb and Judith D. Moran, Substance Abuse, Families and the Courts: The Creation of a CaringJustice
~stem, 3J. HEALTH CARE L. & Pol'y 1,18 (1999) .
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neglected or abused child. "During certain periods in this century,
emphasis has been placed on family integrity and the inviolability of
parents' fundamental rights to the child in all but the most extreme
circumstances of maltreatment. However, in other periods considerations of the child's best interest have been used to j~stify high levels
of state intervention in the parent-child relationsh~r' including
removal of the child and placement in foster care.'"
Currently, the trajectory of public policy has veer~d toward more
state intervention in the lives of children and families. Permanency
for children, the clarion call of the late 1990's, continues into the
new century, resulting in less judicial discretion as to when to terminate parental rights and to free a child for adoption. 17
Prior to the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,
the lawl8 guiding family court judges in cases of child abuse and neglect, although premised on permanency for children, allowed for
considerable judicial discretion in determining when to permanently
remove a child from her family. "Permanency planning meant that
the state would make reasonable efforts to avoid the removal of children from their parents through service plans, would closely monitor
children in placement, and work to reunite parents and children
through supportive services if placement occurred."19 This allowed
judges to make more independent decisions about when to terminate
parental rights.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 20 heralded an era "of
shorter and more stringent time requirements before actions would
be taken to place children in permanent homes through adoption."2 1
The 1997 law curtailed judges by imposing strict timelines on foster
placement, as policymakers reacted to what they believed was an overreliance on preservation and reunification efforts. 22 Thus, the family
court judge was divested of discretion to determine when parents
must demonstrate they are fit to retain or regain custody of their
child or permanently lose their parental rights.
Cultural norms, as they relate to child rearing, also affect the adjudication of child abuse and neglect cases and circumscribe judicial
16 See Robert F. Kelly, FamiJy Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protection Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices,

and Implicationsfor Legal Representation, Judicial Practice, and Public Polig, 34 FAM. L. Q. 359 (2000).
17 See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89.
18 See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272.
19 See Kelly, supra note 16, at 364.
20 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89.
21 See Kelly, supra note 16, at 364.
22 See id.

6

Barbara A. Babb and Judith B. Moran

independence. Although state statutes ideally objectify parenting
standards reflective of social norms, these laws can and do clash with
child rearing practices in minority cultures. 23 Ajudge, although
aware of the clash of cultural norms, may be forced to rule that certain behavior constitutes child neglect, dismissing evidence that a
parent's particular ethnic orientation has influenced his behavior.

Child Custody
As there have been dramatic policy shifts in child welfare, there have
been varying perspectives on child custody, as well. A review of the
case law demonstrates the ebb and flow of judicial decision-making
in this area of family law. The earliest cases devoted to custody decisions demonstrate a paternal preference. 24 By the late nineteenth
century,2 5 the cases reflect judicial veliance on the "tender years presumption," supporting routine custody awards to mothers of young
children, as well as an inclination toward a maternal preference,
regardless of the child's age. 26 At the 20th century's mid-point, history notes that courts craft decisions allowing for custody awards to
the "psychological parent," yielding to social science research demonstrating the value of a child residing with the parent with whom the
child has the strongest emotional bond. Concurrently, the "best
interests" standard, which continues to guide judges in custody decision-making, also has been favored.
Although the "best interests" of the child is the overarching principle
for custody decisions, 27 "[ t] 00 often, gender stereotypes playa role in
custody determinations."28 With the advent of the father's rights
movement in the I970s, yet another perspective on which parent is
the preferable custodian has become part of the child custody debate.
Owing to the substantial political activism stemming from the father's
rights movement,2 9 the political ramifications of a custody award,
rather than the "best interests" of the child, may influence judges
faced with a custody dispute.

Juvenile Delinquency
With the advent of the crime control agenda, which has gained
momentum over the last several decades, many state legislatures have
23 See Yilu Zhao, Cultural Divide Over Parental Discipline, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at B3.
24 See Shannon Dean Sexton, A Custoqy ~stem Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child:
Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custoqy ~stem, 88 Ky. L.J. 761, 765 (1999-2000) (noting that
under English common law the father was the preferred custodian and that this perspective permeated
colonial American jurisprudence).

25 See id. at 768.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 771.

28 See id. at 7 6 2.
29 See id. at 770 (describing the movement to influence state and federal legislators to retool custody laws
so that they are more favorable to fathers).
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responded by enacting laws to impose stiffer punishments on youthful offenders. Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund state in their
report on juvenile offenders that" [p]erceptions of the juvenile crime
epidemic in the early I990's fueled public scrutiny of the system's
ability to effectively control violent juvenile offenders. As a result,
states have adopted numerous legislative changes in an effort to crack
.
down on juvenile crime."3 0
The sweep of changes in juvenile crime l~gislation between I992 and
I997 encompassed nearly every state in the country.3 1 These revisions
to existing statutes resulted in the following: making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal courts, expanding sentencing alternatives, decreasing restrictions on the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings, increasing the role of victims, and modifying correctional
programs. 32
The manner in which the courts handle juvenile offenders is based
on two approaches, both of which involve judicial discretion. In each
instance, the issue is whether the juvenile is tried in an adult court
and, if so, how that occurs. Two states, Tennessee and New York, are
illustrative of the differences. In New York, 33 the crime committed
and the age of the child are automatic determinants of where the
youth is tried. For example, commission of murder in the second
degree at age thirteen compels a trial in an adult criminal court. The
statute does, however, provide for transfer to juvenile court if "the
court determines that to do so would be in the interests of justice."34
The statute lists factors for the court to consider, but, clearly, judicial
discretion is operative in this circumstance. Judges in Tennessee also
are called upon to use discretion in determining whether a juvenile
offender is tried in an adult criminal court. In a departure from New
York law, judges in Tennessee have the discretion to transfer the case
to the adult criminal court after a hearing on the issue. 35
Notwithstanding the different mechanisms for applying adult criminal justice procedures to juvenile causes, judges are likely to be held
accountable by the community for the kind of justice-juvenile or
adultt-to which the youthful offender is subject. Because the focus of
juvenile courts is rehabilitation and not punishment, allowing a juve0

3 See Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, NATIONAL
CENTER FORJUVENILEJUSTICE, September 1999 at 85.
1
3 See id. at 89 (noting that all but three states changed at least one aspect of the laws governing the
adjudication of juvenile criminal offenders).
32 See id.

33 See NY CLS CPL § 1.20, § 210.4-3 2. (a)-(i) (2002).
34 See NY CLS CPL § 210.4-3 db) (2002).
35 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134-. (2) (3) (4-) (2001).
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nile offender to remain in the juvenile system or returning her to it
could cast the judge in a "soft on crime" light. Arguably, given society's crime control agenda, judges resist being independent decisionmakers in this circumstance.

Marital Dissolution
Some of the most difficult decisions judges make in family law cases
are those relating to the legal severance of the marital relationship.
The difficulties arise from the fact that marital dissolution, particularly when children are involved, presents a plethora of issues. The
legal outcomes have substantial long-term consequences, such as how
and by whom the children are cared for, the economic well-being of a
financially dependent spouse, and the fate of extended family relationships with children when grandparents and other relatives wish to
maintain contact with them.
The granting of the divorce itself, despite any of the aforementioned
issues, is fraught with our national ambivalence about the sanctity of
the marital bond. The most 90table examples are the recent state
statutes providing for "covenant marriage," where those contemplating marria~e enter into agreements that make a divorce more difficult
to obtain. 3 In Louisiana, for example, the covenant marriage law
limits the dissolution of the marital relationship to circumstances
involving mostly fault-based grounds. 37
Although covenant marriage as a legislative phenomenon is a rarity,
many state statutes governing marital dissolution reflect our conflicted attitudes about divorce. The fault grounds enumerated in these
laws provide insight into the national psyche surrounding the relationship that "no man shall put asunder." An examination of fault
grounds for divorce actions across several states reflects our collective
wisdom-that only the most egregious acts or the most difficult of circumstances substantiate dissolving the marital relationship. In
Maine, for example, the grounds for divorce include: "adultery;
impotence; extreme cruelty; utter desertion continued for three consecutive years prior to the commencement of the action; and gross
and confirmed habits of intoxication from the use of liquor or
drugs."3 8 Even when irreconcilable differences exist, Maine provides
for judicial discretion to order the couples to counseling. 39 It appears
6
3 SeeMUZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2001), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-202 MICHIE (2001), LA.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273 (WEST 2001).
37 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:237(c) (WEST 2001).
8
3 See MAINE, 19-A M.R.S. § 9021 A-E (2001).
1

:1

,I

:,11

II

39 See MAINE, 19-AM.R.S. § 902 2 (2001): Irreconcilable Differences; Counseling. "If one party alleges

that there are irreconcilable marital differences and the opposing party denies that allegation, the
court upon its own motion or upon motion of either party may continue the case and require both
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that Maine favors reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, or at
least a demonstration, with objective evidence that the marriage cannot be saved. 40
Maryland reveals that its public policy supports maintaining marital
relationships by requiring the court's due diligence as to evidentiary
findings. Maryland's evidentiary requirements for substantiating a
divorce action include similar grounds as those numerated in the
Maine statute, with the additional stricture of a corroborating witness
to testify as to the grounds 41 and a showing that "there is no reasonable expectation of reconciliation."4 2 .
"The prevailing wisdom on divorce.~ .. has, like other cultural attitudes, changed along with the times."43 It is, however, difficult to
gauge these shifting winds of change-whether they are favorable to
divorce, as evidenced by no fault laws, or whether our values support
making divorces more difficult to obtain. With a backdrop of faultbased grounds for divorce in many states, H judges base their decisions on laws with insidious moral underpinnings. The wiggle room
in many statutes with fault - based grounds, such as what constitutes
"cruelty of treatment,"45 gives judges discretion in decision-making
both as to the form and substance of the divorce action. As noted
above, in ,Maine a judge may compel the parties to attend marriage
counseling. The decision to grant a divorce, or at least how to order
the parties to proceed in obtaining one, is undoubtedly influenced by
community norms. But divining those norms is difficult-judges who
are too quick to grant a divorce may suffer reprisals from constituents
whose moral compass veers in the direction of preserving the marital
union, while judges who resist granting a divorce may be judged
harshly, as well. In such a climate of uncertainty, it is not unreasonable to conclude that independent judicial decision-making is threatened by moral and social forces ..

Fantily Violence
Violence between spouses, or other domestic partners, accounts for a
substantial caseload in most family courts. These cases present judges
with immediate safety issues for women and children. The result of
seeking a protective order can place the vulnerable party in danger no
matter what the legal outcome. There have been many cases where the
40 See id. "The counselor shall give a written report of the counseling to the court and to both parties.
The failure or refusal of the party who denies irreconcilable difference to submit to counseling
without good reason is prima facie evidence that the marital differences are irreconcilable."

41 See MD.

FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-101 (1999).

42 See MD. FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-103 (1999).

43 See Daphne Merkin.

Can this Divorce Be Saved? THE NEW YORKER. April 22. 2002. at 192.

H See CODE OF ALA. § 30-2-1. (2001); NY CLS DOM. REL. § 170 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91
(2001); NORTH CAROUNA § 50-5.1.
45 See MD. FAMILY LAw CODE ANN. § 7-103 (7) (1999).
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petitioner is killed leaving the courthouse after obtaining a protection order. Conversely, women whose petitions have been denied
have suffered at the hands of their abusers. These high-stakes outcomes are fodder for the media to cast a bright light on judicial decision-making in family matters. It is not surprising that judges themselves may feel besieged, as they are second-guessed about the wisdom
of their decisions in these most difficult cases. Furthermore, there is
anecdotal evidence from domestic violence advocates that political
influences taint the judiciary regarding these matters. This appears to
be true, particularly in small rural jurisdictions, where a judge's relationships in the community may impact whether to grant an order
that will shed an unfavorable light on a family's private affairs.

III. Other Influences
Media Pressures
Ajudge's worst nightmare may be to read that a youth she sentenced
to probation committed a subsequent crime, or that a woman whose
petition for an order of protection she denied was further harmed by
her alleged batterer. The pressures of community norms and values
are brought to bear in a more dramatic way when the news media
reports the adverse consequences of a judicial decision. Although
there may be no objective measurement to determine the effect of
publicity, the independence 01 the judiciary clearly is compromised
by media attention.
In addition to family court decisions that spawn subsequent violent
criminal acts, other family court matters are also grist for the media
mill. High -profile divorce cases make good copy, and they frequently
contain specific judicial decisions, such as custody awards, child support mandates, and findings of fault:4- 6 As the wisdom of these decisions often is debated in the public arena, the potential for this public controversy to influ~nce a judge is very real, indeed.

Changing Expectations of Tudicial Roles
With the advent of a problem-solving approach to judicial decisionmaking,47 spawned by the growth of specialized courts such as drug

46 See Susan Saulny, 18 Months After Giuliani, Hanover Filesfor Divorce, Citing Adultery, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002,
at B 3 (describing the specifics of the judge's decision regarding child support and spousal
maintenance) .

47 See National Conference of State Court Administrators, Resolution 4, Conference of Chief Justices,
Resolution 22, In Support of Problem-Solving Courts, Conference of Chief Justices, at
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/resolutionproblemsolvingcts.html(resolving to spearhead the problemsolving model for judicial decision-making).
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courts,4- 8 community courts,4-9 and mental health courts,5 0 a judge's
role has changed dramatically. Criminal court judges presiding in
drug courts may find themselves imposing sentences fashioned to
rehabilitate a drug involved felon and monitoring his treatment
regime. The expectations for family court judges, particularly those
involved with child protection matters, often include a quasi-social
work function. The judge is responsible to ensure that the family
receives services, with the hope of keeping children in the home or
facilitating their swift return to the family unit.
There is burgeoning evidence that society's expectations of the judiciary have taken on another dimension. A recent news article devoted
to the issue of an Arizona judge's marijuana use during the period of
time within which he imposed two death sentences highlights the
extent to which a judge's private life should be in the public domain. 51
The federal appellate court challenge to one of the sentences has
resulted in the court's upholding the defendant's death penalty
appeal. Commenting upon the intru$tve aspects of the decision,
Judge Alex Kozinski has noted in his dissenting opinion that "the
decision invited intrusion into judg'~s' personallives."5 2 Echoing the
concerns of the dissent, an Arizona Assistant Attorney General has
opined that the decision could support inquiries about "all sorts of
matters that might influence judicial decision making," including
divorce. 53
If the foregoing case promotes a trend toward the exploration of a
criminal court judge's personal background, then the independence
of the family court bench also may be at risk. Family law matters
relate to iS9;Ues affecting a significant percentage of the population.
Professor Babb notes that family law cases account for more than
35% of the civil case filings in the nation's state courts. 54- In light of
the high volume of this category of cases, it is likely that many family
court judges , and/or their family members, have themselves been
involved in a family court case. Consider the divorced judge presiding in a marital dissolution case. Will her decision be subject to challenge based upon that aspect of her personal history? Further, con4-8 See Honorable Peggy Fulton Hora, Honorable William Schma and John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Court Movement: Revolutioniting the Criminal Justice ~stem SResponse to Drug Abuse and Crime in
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999).
4-9 See Michele Sviridoff, David Rottman, Brian Ostrum and Richard Curtis, DispensingJustice LocalJy, The
Implementation and Effects ofthe Midtown Communi9' Court, HARWOOD ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS, (2000).
50 See Leroy L. Kondo, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Issues AnaJysis and Applications: Advocag ofthe Establishment ofMental
Health Special9' Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic JUrisprudence for MentalJy fll Offenders, 24 SEATTLE L. REV. 373

(2000).
51 See Adam Liptak, Judges Drug Use at Issue in 2 Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at AI.
52 See id.
53 See id. at AI, A22.
54- See Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning An Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in FamiJy Law: Application of an
Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775 (1997)·
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sider the presiding judge in a delinquency case, whose own child has
been involved with the juvenile justice system. Does that fact preclude
him from being impartial, thereby exposing the decision to appellate
review? Holding judges accountable is a hallmark of our judicial system; however, in the quest for accountability, we may jeopardize
judicial independence in the family courts of this country.

Judicial Discretion
The crux of the entire judicial independence dilemma may be society's increasing reluctance to allow for judicial discretion in family
law decision-making. Professor JohnJ. Sampson comments that the
"establishment of basic family law policies by our elected representatives is preferable to leaving those decisions to lawyers, especially
gubernatorially appointed lawyers."55 He argues that "even when
judges are elected, judicial elections virtually never turn on real policy issues, to say nothing of family law policies."5 6 In discussing the
evolution of Texas' joint custody statute, Professor Sampson notes the
legislative trend to enact detailed custody directives. 57 He predicts a
legislative trend toward reducing judicial discretion in family law
matters. 58
Although Professor Sampson speaks from his experience in one state,
the issue he raises regarding who should decide what is best for families resonates with much of the previous discussion of the factors
influencing judicial decision-making. With all the private and complicated matters involved in family law cases, it is not unreasonable to
assume that few of us want a judge to decide them. If the judge is
authorized to do so, we hold her accountable in ways that constrain
her independence, whether through detailed legislative directives,
media publicity, or the power of appointment or election.

IV. Conclusion
The resolution of the issue of judicial independence in the family
court context involves addressing an array of factors that influence a
judge's decision-making. To be sure, the appointment-election
conundrum is one important concern; however, its resolution is not
dispositive of the issue. As discussed earlier, under either selection
process, family court judges are not free of political concerns,
whether they are related to an appointment made by a public official
or the result of election by their local constituents. Furthermore, the
55 See John J.
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565 (1999).
56 See id.
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volatility of family law matters stems from the fact that these issues lie
at the heart of what we hold most dear, our privacy, our homes, our
spouses or partners, and our children. The beliefs that accompany
the issues are closely held, as well, resulting from our own experience
with a family and our reluctance to allow a third party to decide such
private matters.
The context for family law decision-making, thus, is vulnerable to
scrutiny of the judges' decisions, whether they involve which parent is
awarded the custody of a child, how the courts handle a juvenile
delinquent, or whether a marriage is dissolved. This public scrutiny
constrains the actual independence of the family court judge because
family law decisions frequently are subject to collective second-guessing.
The solution proposed to this problem is a relatively simple one, but
it requires a concerted commitment to change the procedures for
placing judges in family court and providing support for them while
they are there.
First, family court judges should be scrutinized aggressively before
they become judges. A rigorous standard for judicial selection can be
implemented, "regardless of whether a given state is an elective state
or an appointive state."59 Most states require that family court judges
have backgrounds that are particularly suited to family law. 60 This
directive should be taken seriously, as it impacts the capacity of a
judge to make the critical decisions involved in family law adjudication. It also would further the interests of "professionalizing the
judiciary," with the hope of convincing the public that "judges ought
to be selected differently than public officials in the political branches."61 Arguably, if the public has confidence in the wisdom of judges,
the conflict about judicial discretion 62 in making family law related
decisions would be reduced.
Second, family court structures and procedures should be optimized
to promote independent judicial decision-making. Professor Babb
suggests that family court reform initiatives promote more informed
and more independent thinking judges.
Finally, sitting judges should receive regular and on -going education
and training in such subjects as family dynamics, domestic violence,
59 See E. Norman Veasey, The Ma1!)l Facets of the Judicial Independence Diamond, 20

(2000).
60 See MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. §3-806 (2002 Replacement Volume).
61 See Geyh, supra note I, at

62 See Sampson, supra note
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and child development in order to promote more public confidence
in the courts. This, in turn, facilitates the public's willingness to
allow judges to judge-unhampered by political second guessing and
personal bias.

